
Several years ago we “formalized” our penetration testing approach into several distinct levels that correlated with the level of assurance the client was seeking and/or the risk associated with the particular network infrastructure under assessment. In that effort we also “formalized” the “less technical” aspects of the Reconnaissance phase of our testing and began referring to this portion of the testing as Deep Web Reconnaissance (DWR) . While the overall effort has been very successful – explaining DWR and the value it provides has been, at times., a little challenging.
I tend to find that “stories” are often the best way to communicate abstract/complex jargon laden ideas (although as a security practitioner you have to be careful to obfuscate key details … which can be challenging).
The time that we found out that the firewall administrator had posted details on the configuration of his new firewall on a vendor message board that allowed us to break in and access critical intellectual property… is infinitely better than
Domain registrars, address registries, web-based services, technical support forums, social media sites, and search engines have all developed as publicly accessible rich information repositories. These data repositories can be mined for sensitive data via aggregation tools.
A recent security incident at ODesk has given us a great story … that we don’t need to obfuscate. A malicious individual commandeered their URL by gaining access to the domain registrar account used to manage that URL. He then attempted to extort ODesk to the tune of $1,000,000. Last year, a group calling itself the Iranian Cyber Army took over similar accounts belonging to Baidu and Twitter. An attack of this nature can be devastating to the company (and its clients) as the hacker could divert all of the traffic to a site under their control, including one that looks identical to the expected site.
You would have to agree that the ODesk story is much more effective than:
DWR identifies a range of potential vulnerabilities, including technical, business information, employee information, and reputation risks. For example, domain registration weaknesses, shared infrastructure weaknesses, sensitive data indexed in search engines, sensitive data disclosure in forums, corporate information leaks…






A Best-Practices Guide to Information Security Attestation













About the Author:
John Verry, CISA, 27001 Certified Lead Auditor, CCSE, CRISC - "Security Sherpa" - Information Security Auditor