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The End of Network Penetration Testing as we Know it ...

Posted by John Verry on Wed, Oct 14, 2009 @ 11:35 AM
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... but I don't feel fine (see REM if you don't get the reference).

Over the last few years significant changes have taken place in the vulnerability discovery space. In the "old days" a vulnerability researcher would discover a vulnerability, report it to the vendor, wait an "acceptable" period of time (for the vendor to (hopefully) issue a patch) and then publically publish their work (and "exploit code").

Fast forward to today, the picture is radically different. Vulnerabilities are bought and sold by both hackers and security companies, often on the shady side of the internet. To anyone in the InfoSec field this is old news; So how does this change Penetration Testing?

Network Penetration Testing is a form of substantiative testing, with three predominant objectives:

  • Determine the probability that a system vulnerability can be exploited
  • If so, determine the impact that the exploit would have on the entity?
  • If so, "shock" management into action by demonstrating the impact in a non-ambiguous manner.

With the number of exploits being "publicly" disclosed dwindling (because the vulnerabilities are being purchased by a security company or other hackers) the amount of "safe" exploit code available to an ethical hacker is dwindling as well. Without exploit code the ability to achieve those three objectives  is radically reduced. Ethical Hackers looking to still "exploit" critical vulnerabilities have two choices:

  • Leverage potentially dangerous exploit code acquired from sites like millw0rm. (However, the exploit may actually contain additional malicious code leaving your client's machine compromised)
  • License a commercial automated penetration testing application (e.g., Core Impact, Canvas) that is buying much of the exploit code on the market).

Frankly, I don't think either option is all that good.

The first encumbers both the ethical hacker and the client with significant risk. Questionable exploit code could contain malicious content resulting in an activity intended to improve the security posture of the network, significantly reducing it.

The latter adds considerable cost, reduces the likelihood that multiple "lower risk" vulnerabilities that can yield access (i.e., leapfrogging or privilege escalation) will be identified (as experience is replaced by push button automation), and reduces/distorts the ability to truly measure probability and/or impact.


We all (clients and ethical hackers alike) have some tough decisions to make. It's the end of network penetration testing as we know it.


To help put it all in perspective, be sure to review – “Stop Wasting Money on Penetration Testing" - on our Pen Testing resource page. You'll find valuable tips to help you properly determine your needs.

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